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Summary 
This paper endeavours to make visible the targeting of poor women from religious 
minorities in contexts where society and/or the state both engage in religious 
‘otherisation’. The paper seeks to contribute to addressing the blind spot in both feminist 
and freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) scholarship on the experiences of the 
intersection of religious marginality, economic exclusion, and gender inequality. The main 
arguments of this paper are presented in five key propositions which describe and 
analyse the ways in which the interface between targeting and vulnerability influence the 
position of women who belong to religious minorities. The final part of the paper 
elucidates the interconnections among the multiple threads informing these propositions 
and what accounts for their prevalence. 
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This paper endeavours to make visible the targeting of poor women from religious 
minorities in contexts where society and/or the state both engage in religious 
‘otherisation’. The two key questions informing this inquiry are first, how are the 
experiences of poor women from religiously marginalised backgrounds different from 
other poor women from the same context? Second, how are the experiences of poor 
women from religiously marginalised backgrounds different from poor men from the 
same background? 
The contentious nature of these questions is well noted: why focus on women who 
belong to religious minorities in particular? Does this not encourage narrow thinking 
insofar as it creates new reified categories and classifications? 
These concerns are legitimate and are addressed in the first part of this paper, which 
discusses the rationale for focusing on women from religiously, economically excluded 
backgrounds. More specifically, it makes the case that, with a few exceptions, they have 
slipped through the cracks of both the copious scholarship on feminism as well as that 
of the burgeoning sphere of freedom of religion or belief. This paper aims to contribute 
to addressing this gap by highlighting the nexus of women’s equality and freedom of 
religion or belief insofar as it seeks to make visible the invisible experiences of women 
marginalised by the intersection of gender, religious affiliation, and class. It recognises 
from the outset that terms such as women from religious minority backgrounds, religious 
otherisation, and targeting are not without their problems; all need to be problematised. 
The epistemic approach informing their operationalisation is also discussed in the 
methodology section that follows. 
The main arguments of this paper are presented in five key propositions, with the first 
one serving as an anchor for the others. Notwithstanding the acknowledgement that 
people have many identities that work together to affect their status and role, when 
women are poor and they belong to religious minorities in settings where religious 





The second proposition makes visible the ways in which the bodies of women who 
belong to religious minorities are used as battlegrounds in political and geostrategic 
struggles. We argue that while there is ‘tactical opportunism’ involved in using them as 
pawns, their targeting is ideologically motivated and exacerbated on account of their 
socioeconomic vulnerability. 
The third proposition describes a more difficult to detect, pernicious form of targeting 
that often initially does not involve the overt use of force: ideologically driven forms of 
sexual grooming of girls and women. 
The fourth proposition looks at the responses from within the community to all forms of 
sexual violence and how communities’ engagement with issues of gender equality 
influence minority women’s trajectories. It particularly looks at how the positioning of the 
broader community as a religious minority, and how their religiously inspired 
conceptions of honour, impact on religious minority women. 
Having engaged with the politics, political economy, and social norms that influence the 
positioning and targeting of women who happen to be poor and come from religious 
minorities in the first four propositions, the fifth and last proposition engages with the 
legal arena as a site of direct and indirect disproportionate harm to women who belong 
to religious minorities, in particular those who happen to suffer from multiple economic 
and social vulnerabilities. 
The final part of the paper elucidates the interconnections among the multiple threads 
informing these propositions. For every one of these, similar claims can be made for 
poor women more broadly or for women with other identifiers, such as those belonging 
to ethnic or linguistic minorities or indigenous movements where the norms are of 
homogenisation. This is undoubtedly true; however, by presenting these propositions, the 
intention here is not to create a hierarchy of those who suffer the most. There is no 
implicit suggestion from this critical inquiry that poor, religiously marginalised women 
are those who suffer the most or worst forms of encroachment. Rather, it is to establish 
the case for the recognition of their targeting, and where relevant, to challenge the 
claims that such targeting is exclusively on the basis of their gender, ethnicity, class, or 
even geographic location. 
While the paper recognises the intersections of inequalities and intertwining drivers of 
vulnerability, it also endeavours to make explicit the nexus between gender, religious 
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marginality, and poverty. This is critically important because without this recognition, 
religiously marginalised economically excluded women will continue to fall between the 
cracks, experiencing patterns of inequality, discrimination, and violence that are 




1. Conceptual framing and interpretive 
framework 
The nexus between freedom of religion or belief and women’s equality covers a wide 
array of issues and conundrums. However, this paper focuses on one particular 
problématique: the experiences of poor women from religious minorities living in 
contexts of religious otherisation. 
All of these terms are contentious. For example, the term ‘poor’ may be seen as reifying 
identities, the term ‘women’ may be seen as exclusionary of more gender-fluid identities, 
and the term ‘religious minorities’ is replete with complexity, given that there is a 
considerable diversity of practices/beliefs within all religions which are not always 
welcomed. Minorities can be recognised or unrecognised. A group that is a minority in 
the national context may be a majority and dominate power and decision-making in 
another province or locality or country. 
‘Religious minorities’ and ‘religious otherisation’ may sound ‘fuzzy’ to some. Here, a 
clarification of the use of these terms and the rationale for a focus on this particular 
problématique is needed. 
 
1.1 Freedom of religion or belief 
Freedom of religion or belief is a very broad term that encompasses those exercising 
faith and no faith. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights offers a broad 
and helpful definition of freedom of religion or belief: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance (UN 1948).1 
UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion or Belief, Dr Ahmed Shaheed, notes that 
the right to freedom of religion or belief belongs to individuals, not religions. This very 
much informs the parameters of this inquiry insofar as the focus is on the experiences of 





minority background. Being of a religious minority background may be by choice (having 
a sense of belonging) or prescribed by default on account of having been born into a 
community which identifies with a particular religion. The focus on the rights to freedom 
of religion or belief for women of a religious minority background has implications for 
this inquiry insofar that it is not just encroachments from people who belong to the 
mainstream religion that are addressed but also those features/factors that emanate 
from the practices within one’s own religion. In other words, there are always going to 
be several layers of power dynamics at work, both within women’s own religious 
communities and their relationship with the broader community. 
The intersection of gender and religious affiliation in patriarchal contexts has long been 
recognised as one presenting tensions between a religious community’s right to preserve 
its communal practices and internal organisation and an individual’s right to be free from 
the violation of their right to gender equality (for excellent examples of this debate see 
Nazila Ghanea 2018, Petersen 2020, Shaheed 2020). 
 
1.2 Women’s equality 
Women’s equality also needs definition. Our inquiry’s focus on challenging power 
relations is influenced by Kate Young’s work on challenging gender power relations 
between women and men (Young 1993). We understand that women with more gender-
fluid identities would have wide arrays of struggles beyond that of equality between 
women and men, but the focus on power relations between women and men as 
informing the definition of women’s equality adopted here is informed by the fact that 
our subjects were heterosexual women (see below). 
We now turn our attention to the focus of our inquiry; that is, heterosexual women who 
are of religious minority heritage or faith as distinct from both those who identify with 
more fluid gender identities and those from within mainstream dominant religious 
backgrounds, whether by choice or circumstance. We concur with Petersen’s eloquently 
presented argument regarding the fact that when we refer to gender and freedom of 
religion or belief, this encompasses a wide array of differently positioned subjects: 
Women and girls in religious minorities may be particularly vulnerable to 
intersectional discrimination, but people in majority religious communities can 
also experience gendered consequences of FoRB violations, or experience gender 
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discrimination in particular ways because of their particular religious affiliation and 
identity, for instance religious feminists, reformers or others from the religious 
majority who interpret their religion in ways that challenge the orthodoxy. 
Women who are atheists, humanists or other types of non-believers, or who 
refrain from practicing their religion may also experience various forms of 
intersectional discrimination. Around the globe, SOGI [sexual orientation and 
gender identity] minorities face restrictions on where and how they can practice 
their faith, imposed by the state, religious authorities as well as the broader 
society (Petersen 2020: 16). 
While all the groups mentioned above experience the intertwining of gender inequality 
and violation of their freedom of religion or belief, they have very different 
positionalities. Positionality is a feminist theoretical concept that challenges the notion of 
value-free objective social inquiry and highlights that not only does the person’s own 
subjectivity (class, gender, race, etc.) influence how they engage with reality but also how 
people perceive him/her, often independently of whether these perceptions are aligned 
with the person’s own self-identification, attitudes, beliefs, or actions. This is critical in 
that heterosexual women who belong to religious minorities will often be very differently 
positioned in relation to their own religious institutions’ hierarchies and in relation to 
broader gender hierarchies in society than women from the same communities who 
happen to be LGBTQI+. 
This would also apply to the positionality of women who are challenging 
gender/religious hierarchies while being situated within dominant/mainstream religions. 
The same is true with respect to the positionality of religious minority women who are 
challenging conservative interpretations that circumscribe their rights emanating from 
within religious hierarchies. How society engages with them is often greatly influenced by 
their association with their religious minority group. This in turn means that the kind of 
hierarchies in which they are situated are distinct from those affecting women in general 
in those societies. Women who are contesting the nexus of gender and religious practice 
from within the religious majority would be engaging in a set of struggles that are 
greatly shaped by their own positionality. 
In addition to the notion of differentiated positionalities, this inquiry endeavours to make 
a very specific contribution on patterns of inequality associated with economic 
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vulnerability and religious marginality. It looks at these patterns of inequality in terms of 
how they affect women belonging to religious minorities across contexts. This 
complements existing scholarship on the nexus of gender and freedom of religion or 
belief, which is broader in its coverage of LGBTQI+ and women from mainstream 
religions (i.e. Petersen 2020 and Shaheed 2020). They both cover a plurality of genders 
as well as women from mainstream religious backgrounds (Shaheed 2020). A special 
compilation of articles in IDS Bulletin 41.5 (Tadros 2010) also engages with the struggles 
of feminists who challenge the encroachment of both the instrumentalisation of religion 
and gender by state and non-state actors to circumscribe rights. 
 
1.3 Religious minority women 
The third term that requires elaboration is ‘religious minority women’. Labelling women 
as religious minority women can be a form of reification that is completely dissonant 
with their own way of representing themselves. Worse, such forms of labelling can be 
politically so offensive that they can be seen locally within religious minority groups as 
driven by an external political agenda to create incendiary fault-lines in a community. 
The only way to circumvent this is to be clear that our use of ‘religious minority women’ 
is descriptive, not normative. Methodologically, it is also key that women have the space 
to self-describe without having to feel under pressure – overt or covert – to ‘insert’ 
themselves under any label. 
In many contexts, it is still very dangerous to self-identify as a member of a religious 
group and therefore people sometimes conceal their identities: for example, for the 
Ahmadis in Pakistan or the Kakais in Iraq. There needs to be a modicum of civil and 
political liberties in a country to create an enabling environment for women to self-name 
without coming under risk of complete repression. 
In India, the term ‘minority women’ is officially used; for example, there is a Ministry of 
Minority Affairs which has specific programmes for minority women. In Myanmar, the 
term minority women is not used at all and when women identify themselves by their 
geographic or ethnic identity, this brings them into direct confrontation with the state 
and society. For example, to self-represent as Rohingya women would incur hostility 
from the Burmese government, which recognises the population presiding in that state 
as Bengali migrants. 
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In Pakistan, referring to Ahmadi women as a religious minority risks denying their faith 
(as under Pakistani law, religious minorities are defined as ‘non-Muslims’). In Tajikistan, 
women who can organise by language group or ethnicity cannot organise as religious 
minorities as this is far more politically sensitive and invites state interference. In Nigeria, 
Christian and Muslim women would only be considered a numerical and political 
minority by region since the demographic composition between the two is very similar. 
Only Animists, Atheists, and denominations within these two main religions would be a 
minority in all parts of the country. 
In Iraq, there are several coalitions, networks, and collective platforms that have emerged 
since the American-led invasion, formed to respond to the threats to religious pluralism 
in the country: for example, the Coalition of Iraqi Minorities Network. There is no specific 
platform for women from minorities. The latter either organise under strong women’s 
networks (all encompassing) or under minority networks, or often through both. Perhaps 
they did not see a need for specific representation when both platforms allow for an 
engagement with the intersection of gender and marginality. 
In Egypt, the challenge of organising as minority women emanates from the deep 
discomfort associated with the word ‘minority’. Similarly to several Middle Eastern 
contexts, in Egypt, the term religious minority conjures negative images. To be a minority 
is to be a foreigner with no claims of indigeneity; it is to be in collusion with the West 
and needing special protection. Where did these associations emanate from? Seteny 
Shami (2009) argues that the first time the word minority entered the lexicon of terms 
used to describe Christians in the region was in the early 1920s, when political elites 
were debating whether the new Egyptian constitution should include specific language 
concerning the protection of religious minorities. The British colonialist labelling of non-
Muslim communities in Egypt as minorities was a political project, according to Shami, 
intended to justify colonialist control over matters of internal governance. 
Many champions of national liberation emphasised that their countries were not divided 
along religious lines and that to talk of religious minorities would be to endorse 
colonialist divide-and-rule strategies for the justification of interventionist policies. In 
many cases where the term minority was introduced by colonialists in the Middle East, it 
became associated in the minds of the colonised with the religion of the coloniser. This 
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led indigenous churches that have existed in the region for centuries to declare their ties 
to the land by insisting they are not minorities. 
Caste is another special case concerning religious minority women. Hindu women 
prescribed to belong to a ‘low caste’ may not differ to any great extent in their religious 
beliefs or practices from other caste women from the same religious community. 
However, they do not believe that caste should be a determinant of inequality in society 
or that religious doctrine mandates that this should be so. This crucial difference means 
that those who are affected by and resist caste oppression constitute a religious 
minority. 
Therefore, in contexts where historical appropriation of the term minority makes it 
socially/politically undesirable to use, or where its usage would elicit a crackdown, what 
frames of reference do women use to talk about themselves, their lives and experiences? 
Despite the differences within and across women, groups, and communities, there are 
multiple narratives shared with different audiences for different purposes. 
However, beyond the ideological, political, and historical reasons why there may be 
conundrums associated with the term ‘religious minority women’, there may also be 
issues of strategic framing in relation to the audience with which women are engaging. 
For example, when girls were kidnapped in Nigeria in 2014 by Boko Haram, even though 
they happened to be majority Christian and their religious affiliation was a key driver of 
their targeting (see proposition two), the movement to hold the government to account 
for its responsibility to rescue them and to hold the kidnappers accountable did not 
organise to press for their rights as ‘religious minority girls’, nor did they organise along 
religious lines. In a comprehensive review of the Bring Back Our Girls movement, Aina et 
al. note that: 
The #BBOG remained a non-faith-based movement. Its activists come from across 
all faiths and there were efforts to sustain an interfaith posture through the 
composition of the leadership that included both Christians and Muslims       
(Aina et al. 2019: 25). 
In the context of Nigerian politics, any use of religious labelling could be appropriated 
by political forces to divert attention from the issue. Similarly, in India, when Muslim 
women mobilised against the discriminatory citizenship law that was promulgated by the 
Indian government, they chose to do so under the banner of being Indian citizens, lifting 
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high Indian flags, rather than as a persecuted Muslim minority (which they are). Such a 
strategic action was informed by their encouragement of the broader Indian polity to 
join them in protecting the Indian constitution rather than perceiving them as an 
interest-based group in a political struggle with the status quo. 
For the above reasons, this critical inquiry differentiates between the descriptive use of 
women who belong to religious minorities/are from religious minority backgrounds and 
the normative representation of women, which is not only ideological, historical, and 
political, but also highly fluid, shifting according to the audience at hand. 
 
1.4 Poverty and intersecting inequalities 
The second important qualifier regarding the term ‘women who belong to religious 
minorities’ used in this inquiry is to take note of the fact that there is no homogenous 
group called ‘poor religious minority women’. The labelling of individuals/communities as 
poor is politically contentious since people may not describe themselves as such. 
Moreover, within and among religious minorities in any given context, there are very 
large disparities politically, economically, socially, and ideologically. A wealthy Shia 
woman living in Islamabad is in a very different position to a poor low-caste Hindu 
woman living in the same context. In fact, the Muslim Shia woman may not even wish to 
associate with the Hindu woman on caste and faith grounds. Hence, again, the term 
poor is used descriptively in terms of socioeconomic exclusion, rather than normatively 
as a label. 
Experiences of intersecting inequalities should not be confused with assuming 
intersecting identities. Religious, ethnic, and other identities are subject to change in 
representation across time and context, as previously mentioned. However, the 
disentangling of ethnicity from religious identity is not always so straightforward. For 
example, historically in Myanmar with respect to the Muslims who lived in Rakhine State, 
‘for successive generations their ethnicity and Islam have been practically not 
distinguishable’ (Chan 2005: 414). One of the greatest challenges to the recognition of 
freedom of religion or belief violations is when there is oversight of the fact that people 
are targeted because of their ethnic and religious identifiers. For example, in northern 
Nigeria and Myanmar, conflict is driven by both inter-ethnic tensions but also attempted 
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religious homogenisation by extremist Muslims and Buddhists respectively (Open Doors 
2020). 
Certainly these identifiers, while distinct, are deeply intertwined, influencing the kind of 
vulnerabilities that women experience. As will be suggested in proposition one, when 
you are a poor (socioeconomic status) woman (gender) living in a community where 
religious bigotry is rising, you may not be able to afford to move elsewhere. You may 
also be in a position where due to limited skills and connections, the options for income 
generation are limited and therefore what is available exposes you to particular forms of 
encroachment that a middle or upper-class woman would be able to avoid. Yet when 
you are accused of blasphemy – and you belong to a religious minority – it is difficult to 
simply reduce this to ethnic identity. Class and gender have affected the nature of your 
exposure and vulnerability, but the accusation is not only about ethnicity, but religion. 
Making visible ways in which multiple identifiers create vulnerabilities that are not equally 
experienced among women and men is critical for understanding how people come to 
be targeted. 
Another critical reason informing why this inquiry is focused on intersecting inequalities 
rather than identities is because the latter is often framed in highly individualistic terms. 
Westocentric conceptions of agency are often construed around very individualistic ideas 
of personhood. It is critically important to note that women’s lives are interconnected. 
While we focus on the intersecting inequalities/vulnerabilities experienced by a woman, it 
does not mean that vulnerabilities experienced by men do not directly and personally 
affect her. 
Moreover, one of the reasons why this paper’s focus is on the intersection of 
vulnerabilities rather than identities is because the experience of inequality should not be 
confused with identity. People may experience inequalities but their self-perception and 
representation of themselves may not be a perfect mirror of what they experience. In 
other words, women may experience religious persecution but may not identify as 
‘persecuted’; they may be poor but they may refuse to project themselves as ‘poor’ and 
so forth. Moreover, experiences of vulnerability do not preclude full exercise of women’s 
agency as manifested in acts of resistance, subversion, and strategic accommodation, to 
which we will make reference throughout. Finally, women can also be perpetrators of 
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violations of freedom of religion or belief and exercise leadership in ways that subjugate 
other women and men (Petersen 2020). 
 
1.5 Religious otherisation 
In understanding the experiences of religious marginality of women from religious 
minority and poor backgrounds, our inquiry refers to another concept that needs 
elucidation: religious otherisation. Religious otherisation here refers to both a process 
and an outcome. There is a process of religious otherisation inherent in who is 
included/excluded and processes of establishing hierarchies of worth/value. By religious 
otherisation, we mean more than having a different religion. We refer to where 
differences become the basis of identifying you as ‘the other’, as someone who is not 
‘one of us’. With reference to the use of the term religious otherisation in our context, it 
is reflective of a relationship of power, rather than a numerical status. 
To be a woman and a member of a religious minority does not automatically mean 
being persecuted. It can also mean being part of a religious minority that enjoys a 
position of privilege, not subordination: for example, being a woman and an Alawi in 
pre-civil war Syria, or a Sunni woman who belongs to the wealthy class in Bahrain. When 
we talk about religious otherisation, we don’t just mean a numerical minority, but a 
minority in relation to the exercise of power in various domains – political, economic, 
social, and cultural. Some insidious processes of religious otherisation are so subtle that 
they are easy to overlook, especially when they are not accompanied by overt forms of 
violence or force (see proposition three on grooming). 
Religious otherisation is also an outcome, in the sense that it often endeavours to 
achieve religious homogenisation, whether violently through religious cleansing and 
demographic engineering or more subtly by making day-to-day life so impossible that 
people have no option but to deny their religious identity and assimilate or leave. In one 
sense, religious homogenisation is a political project, a vision shared by a set of actors 
for how society and politics should be organised. 
In our inquiry, we explore patterns of insidious long-term religious otherisation through 
systemic discriminatory economic policies (see proposition one) or through specific 
processes and acts. Targeting is complex and can take many different forms but 
essentially it refers to the purposeful identification of certain individuals or groups on the 
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basis of particular traits with the intent to act on them. This is very clear in the politically 
orchestrated sexual grooming of Hindu girls and women in Pakistan as per proposition 
three. It can also refer to the pre-existence of certain characteristics (for example, the 
intersection of religion, gender, and socioeconomic vulnerability, or geographic location) 
that makes individuals or communities vulnerable to becoming the object of action even 
if such action is not pre-planned. For example, Iraq is majority Shia; however, Turkmen 
Shia women living in areas occupied by ISIS would be a minority. In this context, 
religious otherisation is context-bound, influenced by factors such as living in areas 





The paper draws on primary and secondary data from six contexts (Egypt, Pakistan, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, India, and Iraq). In the initial stage, secondary data was collected and 
analysed on the situation of women and men in these six countries. The choice of 
contexts, with the exception of India, was on the basis that these are countries in which 
the CREID programme is being implemented. India was added on the basis of its 
heightened state of religious otherisation and on account of its promotion of an 
expression of religious homogenisation from a faith that was not represented as a 
majority religion in the other five contexts (Hindu majoritarianism). 
The contexts under study are all ones experiencing major challenges to social cohesion 
which have in the past or are currently experiencing high levels of communal violence. 
Iraq and Myanmar have had genocides against religious minorities, there is a genocide 
alert for Nigeria, Egypt is fighting an internal insurgency by terrorists in Sinai, Pakistan’s 
denial of rights to its many religious minorities is acute, while India has witnessed a 
major deterioration in its treatment of religious minorities, in particular Muslims. All six 
countries are ones where the policies and practices of religious homogenisation and 
otherisation are both visible and subtle. These are all contexts where the size of the 
population of religious minorities varies. In Nigeria, Christians and Muslims represent 
roughly equal proportions of the population, with a very small Animist percentage. Thus, 
we refer to ‘contexts’ rather than countries as in this particular case we are exploring the 
context of northern Nigeria, where Christians are a minority, or in Iraq where Shias in 
some parts of the country represent a minority. The use of the word ‘contexts’ as 
opposed to ‘countries’ in the pages that follow also reflect the fact that self-identification 
by religious groups will differ from one geographic area to another. For example, the 
Rohingya people from Rakhine State are Muslim; however, there is also another group 
from Rakhine State who are Muslim but do not identify as Rohingya (MRG 2019). 
In Egypt, the Copts account for 10 per cent of the population. In Iraq, 97 per cent of the 
population is Muslim. Shia Muslims constitute 55 to 60 per cent of the population. Sunni 
Muslims are approximately 40 per cent of the population, while Christians, Shabak, 
Yazidis, Kakais, Sabeans, and Bahais all constitute a tiny (and decreasing) percentage of 
the non-Muslim population (US State Department 2019c). In India, ‘Hindus constitute 
79.8 percent of the population, Muslims 14.2 percent, Christians 2.3 percent, and Sikhs 
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1.7 percent. Groups that together constitute less than 1 percent of the population 
include Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians (Parsis), Jews, and Baha’is’ (US State Department 
2019). 
In Pakistan, 80–85 per cent of the population is Muslim, of which ‘Shia, including Hazara, 
Ismaili, and Bohra (a branch of Ismaili), are generally believed to make up 15–20 percent’. 
(US State Department 2019a). Unofficial estimates vary widely with regard to the size of 
minority religious groups. Religious community representatives estimate religious groups 
not identifying as Sunni, Shia, or Ahmadi Muslim constitute 3 to 5 per cent of the 
population, while community sources put the number of Ahmadi Muslims at 
approximately 500,000–600,000 (ibid). 
In Myanmar, approximately 88 per cent of the population are Theravada Buddhists. 
Approximately 6 per cent are Christians (primarily Baptists, Roman Catholics, and 
Anglicans, along with several small Protestant denominations). Muslims (mostly Sunni) 
comprise approximately 4 per cent of the population and there is a tiny percentage who 
practise indigenous religions (US State Department 2019b). 
The fact that these six contexts comprise processes of religious otherisation initiated by 
powerholders from different religious backgrounds (Hindu in India, Muslim in Iraq, 
northern Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt, Buddhist in Myanmar) was important 
methodologically for exploring whether these recurring patterns are in any way 
associated with the nature of the dominant religion of those who wield power. The fact 
that these represent very different religious backgrounds and yet we could identify 
patterns (represented in the propositions) is highly significant. This is analysed further in 
the section on the ‘governmentality of targeting’. 
A literature review was undertaken on the position and situation of women from 
religious minority backgrounds in all six countries. There was a paucity of academic 
literature exclusively focused on the intersection of religious and socioeconomic 
marginality affecting women from religious minority backgrounds. There were a few 
sources in grey literature (mostly from faith-based advocacy or human rights 
organisations) but even then, where there was a focus on religious marginality 
experienced by women, the role of class was largely overlooked. 
The author also draws on her own action research over the course of over 20 years with 
the Copts of Egypt, the largest religious minority in the Middle East, and specifically with 
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Coptic women from marginalised socioeconomic backgrounds. From the author’s own 
research and review of the secondary literature, there were some recurring themes, 
despite the very different religious composition, historical trajectories, and political 
configurations on the ground. These themes amounted to some recurring patterns which 
explain the distinctness of the dynamic intersection and influence of gender, religious 
marginality, and socioeconomic exclusion on the ground. 
The five propositions together represent the starting point of an iterative process of 
framing, data gathering, and validation and a continued revisiting of our assumptions. 
Initially, the author had framed 11 different propositions of the relationships between 
gender, religious marginality, and socioeconomic exclusion as they relate to women from 
religious minorities in these six countries. In order to validate their framing, relevance, 
validity, and accuracy, a workshop was held between 21–24 January 2020 in Brighton, UK, 
convened by the Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development (CREID). The 
purpose of the workshop was to gain a greater understanding of the intersectionality of 
inequalities, specifically of being a woman and a member of a marginalised religious 
group in one of CREID’s five programme countries; Egypt, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, and 
Pakistan; and to develop a collective and comparative understanding across these 
country contexts of the implications of this for women’s positions and roles in relation to 
the state, social justice, and development policy and practice more broadly. 
Sensitivity to positionality was at the heart of the selection of participants. Who was 
collecting the data and how the data was collected and used is of equal importance (and 
one can argue of greater importance) than what was being collected. Through the CREID 
programme, we identified lay women and men from within the communities in four of 
the five contexts whose positionalities granted them legitimacy and trust within their 
communities. This is on account of being activists raising issues of discrimination, or 
practitioners engaged in community service and support, or both. In all cases, they are 
considered leaders whether they assume formal or informal leadership positions in their 
contexts. This is not to suggest that they ‘represent’ their communities given that 
communities are multi-vocal and diverse, and the boundaries of where a community 
starts and ends are very blurred. In addition, we invited feminist-scholars from Egypt, 
Pakistan, and other countries who were able to serve as critical allies, probing and 
challenging as well as providing cross-country comparisons. The selection of participants 
was also informed by fairly common standpoints in relation to gender, class, and 
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religious inclusivity in the sense that all shared a commitment to social justice for the 
poor, for women’s equality, and for religiously plural and inclusive societies. 
In the workshop, we collectively visited the propositions which resonated widely with 
participants’ own analysis of their contexts through examples and specific case studies, 
many of which are shared in this paper. We also sought to analyse patterns of inequality 
in terms of whether the nature of vulnerability can be explained with respect to religious 
marginality, gender, or class, or the intersections of all. This was extremely important in 
order to distinguish between experiences of vulnerability that face all poor women 
regardless of religious affiliation, those that are specific to women of a particular 
religious group, and those that affect both women and men of a religious minority. In 
the process of gauging the divergences and convergences across different contexts, we 
thought best to merge some of the propositions so that they would encompass a wide 
array of experiences. The author also reworded some of the propositions for greater 
clarity as to what exactly distinguishes those patterns characterising the nexus between 
gender, religious marginality, and economic exclusion. We also interrogated some of the 
drivers behind these patterns of inequality, drawing both on historical longue durée 





3. Proposition One: Intersecting 
vulnerabilities 
People have many identities that work together to affect their status and 
their role. When women are poor and they belong to religious minorities, 
they will experience power and powerlessness in particular ways. 
There is broad consensus around the role of class and inequality in shaping the 
wellbeing prospects of people living in poverty (ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016). The 
intertwining of gender and economic discrimination often leads to particular forms of 
economic exclusion faced by poor women (ibid). However, experiences of economic 
exclusion can be further compounded by the fact that not only are the women poor but 
they belong to religious minorities. This is often overlooked in inequalities literature 
(such as in the report above which makes no mention of religious inequalities of any 
kind). 
Gender, class, and religious inequalities generate particular vulnerabilities. First, the 
opportunities for religious minority women tend to be significantly more restricted in the 
areas of education and employment, influencing their overall prospects of economic 
betterment. In Myanmar, the intersection of class, gender, religious affiliation and 
geographic location has meant that poor Muslim women of Rohingya origin in Rakhine 
State are acutely disadvantaged in terms of economic opportunities compared to non-
Muslims, to men, to the non-poor, and to other Muslims living in other parts of the 
country. Participants in the CREID workshop noted that although the occupation of a 
maid is fraught with insecurities – financial, physical, and social, with minimal pay, 
tenuous conditions, and social stigma – domestic work is available to women from 
different religious and ethnic backgrounds, but Muslim Rohingya women are excluded. 
Many Burmese households consider Muslim Rohingya women as impure and would not 
hire them (comments from activists attending the workshop). 
In Pakistan, members of the Hindu and Christian community are expected to assume the 
lowest paid, most dangerous, most socially stigmatised professions. A combination of 
caste, poverty, and religious affiliation severely circumscribes the employment and 
income-generating opportunities available to these women. Disproportionately, they are 
expected to be the maids and the cleaners. A particular term is used to delineate their 
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positioning in society, Chuhra, a stigmatised term representing a source of impurity and 
pollution. Firdus, a poor Christian living in Pakistan, pointed out: ‘Some believe we are 
born for this dirty sanitation and cleaning work and scornfully call us “chuhra” (a modern 
equivalent might be ‘toilet cleaner’)’ (Aqeel 2020). She notes that the process of 
otherisation is one experienced from society at large as they are perceived to be 
engaged in dirty work, so other groups keep at a safe distance. 
The intersection of gender, religious affiliation, and class with respect to women who 
belong to religious minorities influences the repertoires or resources they have to 
exercise their agency. Repertoires here refers to the political, economic, social, and 
religious resources that can be leveraged in order to cope with challenging realities. For 
example, men from the same religious minority may enjoy greater mobility on account of 
gender. They may be able to build up more social networks on account of being able to 
occupy certain spaces that are not seen as acceptable for women to be present in (youth 
clubs, for example). 
Moreover, as many religious communities are also inherently patriarchal, men may be 
able to assume positions of leadership in that community that would not be acceptable 
for women to assume. This influences the ways in which poor women who belong to 
religious minorities can exercise their agency, and the kind of opportunities and 
vulnerabilities emanating from this. For example, in June 2016, in a market in Kato, 
Nigeria, 74-year-old Bridget Agbahime, a woman of Igbo origin who was also the wife of 
a pastor, was lynched by a mob in front of her store. Agbahime had asked a man who 
was performing ablutions in front of her store to leave so that she could trade. He 
accused her of blaspheming the Prophet Mohammed and incited the other traders to 
attack her, leading to her beheading in the market. While the perpetrators were arrested 
on the spot, five months later, all five were acquitted of their crimes (USCIRF 2017: 36). 
The fact that men and women, Muslim and Christian (the latter the majority) have 
experienced violence to the point of death on charges of alleged blasphemy should not 
detract from how Bridget Agbahime’s position made her vulnerable to being attacked. As 
a pastor’s wife, her religious identity as a Christian in a majority Muslim northern state of 
Nigeria made her stand out. It was not an identity she could conceal even if she wanted 
to. Her identity as an Igbo from the southern part of Nigeria in a national context where 
Hausa–Igbo tensions run high would have also contributed to her vulnerability. Her 
24 
 
position was also affected by the intersection of her gender identity and economic 
status: she was in the market because she was engaging in income-generating activities 
to support her family. 
The intention here is to make clear that her being lynched in the market is at least in 
part affected by the intersections of her identity which influenced her choices and where 
she was, what she was doing, and the kind of targeting she faced. Being a member of a 
religious and ethnic minority in a context in which hostilities against both identities run 
high made her especially vulnerable because she did not have the economic and social 
capital resources that would have allowed her to simply choose a less exposed way of 
earning a livelihood. 
Perhaps where poor religiously and economically marginalised women experience 
particular vulnerabilities from which their middle-class and wealthy counterparts are to a 
certain extent insulated is with regard to how they can shield themselves from hostilities 
in public space. Middle and upper-class women can sometimes avoid spaces where there 
is communal violence by moving residence to other places. They can also, at the very 
least, use vehicles for transport instead of having to walk. Moreover, the skillset and 
social capital of middle-class and wealthy minority women may give them more choices 
in the kind of income-generating activities that are available to them. However, as Fatima 
Suleiman in the workshop noted, when women are poor and they belong to religious 
minorities, their dress is distinct from what the women who belong to the majority wear 
and they will stick out. With reference to Christian women in the north of Nigeria, Fatima 
noted that poor Christian women ‘live in constant fear of being raped and abducted, and 
are blamed for this violence because of how they dress. However, this is compounded by 
the fact that their “dress” doesn’t conform with the Islamic-influenced expectation that 
women cover their heads and faces.’ This informs the need for advocacy, for women’s 
voices to be amplified, both to strengthen responses to poverty alleviation and to 
improve education on minority rights and inclusivity in order to improve the position of 
minority women in Nigeria. 
 
We also need to consider that poorer religious minority women may feel the need to 
avoid some income-generating opportunities because of a chill effect as a result of 
incidents like the Nigerian example cited above. Religious minority women’s poverty may 
result from the fact that it is too unsafe for them to carry out certain types of work, 
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driving them towards lower paid opportunities which may be perceived as safer. Where 
an active ‘religious otherisation’ process is occurring, women who belong to religious 
minorities may find themselves with deeply confined opportunities. 
Yet even with deeply circumscribed choices influenced by the intersection of poverty, 
religious minority status, and gender, women do exercise agency. Often women who 
belong to religious minorities and are poor may not assume formal leadership positions 
in the religious institutions that shape their lives because of the elitist and patriarchal 
hierarchy of these institutions. However, poor women who belong to religious minorities 
are not just victims; they exercise leadership in multiple forms and expressions. A case in 
point is the mass mobilisation of Indian Muslim women against the infamous citizenship 
law in India (see proposition five on details of the law). Hoda (2020, unpaginated) notes 
that since December 2019 when the protests began against the citizenship laws, we have 
seen ‘the vanguard role played by women. This is their moment. This is their movement.’ 
Hoda notes that while they are aware of their targeting as members of a Muslim 
community, by engaging in public mobilisation against the state, they are engaging in 
acts that simultaneously, even if not intentionally, constitute a rupture with the purdah 
expectations of the Muslim clergy. 
Hoda (2020, unpaginated) notes: 
That these women, as a collective, are in the lead, has irredeemably dented the 
Indian Muslim patriarchy. This may be the first time that they have dominated the 
public space in such a resounding manner. It is not only going to formalize the 
already modified gender equation within the family, but also to institutionalize 
new standards of propriety by displacing the Purdah prudery which kept in place 
a women-phobic discourse of piety and propriety. 
Hoda’s elucidation takes note of how in mobilising against the state, the acts themselves 
constitute forms of dissent against inhibitions to women’s emancipation that may have 
long-lasting and unintended positive consequences on their exercise of leadership. From 
the images of protesting women, it is clear this is not a small cohort of elitist or middle-
class women, but a large constituency cutting across class divides. 
Moreover, women from religiously marginalised poor groups also exercise agency on 
certain occasions by joining other women in mobilising around common economic, 
social, or political interests. We hope the upcoming research will shed light on the 
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circumstances around which women from religious minorities join or refrain from 





4. Proposition Two: Political pawns and 
more 
International and local actors have used women who belong to religious 
minorities as political pawns in power struggles and their bodies as the 
battlegrounds for the subjugation of religious communities at large. 
Since at least the 1990s, there has been a growing recognition that in conflict contexts, 
women’s bodies become a major battleground on which political and geostrategic 
struggles for domination and exercise of power are played out between different actors. 
The passing of the UN Resolution 1325 in 2000 is considered a ground-breaking 
recognition of the atrocities committed against women in contexts of war and violence 
(Tryggestad 2009). However, there are other ways in which the instrumentalisation of 
women to legitimise geostrategic and political ends are manifest. Abu-Lughod (2002, 
2014) and Kandiyoti (2011) have written extensively about how the United States’ 
justification of going to war in Afghanistan, which was premised on the liberation of 
Afghani women, was only a cover-up for geostrategic interests. The nature of policies 
implemented on the ground (Kandiyoti 2011) and the striking of the peace deal with the 
Taliban made such claims of women’s liberation redundant. It is highly relevant that the 
current US president, Donald Trump, has signed a peace agreement with the very same 
Taliban whose gender ideology was one of the justifications given for waging war in the 
first place. 
However, the instrumentalisation of women who belong to religious minorities by global 
actors has not been given the same recognition in feminist scholarship. In 2015, ISIS 
beheaded 20 Copts in Libya. In its widely publicised video, it claimed it was an act of 
revenge against the Coptic Church for allegedly holding in captivity Coptic women who 
had converted to Islam. In the video, ISIS promised to engage in further terrorist attacks 
on the ‘crusaders’ for retaining Muslim women ‘Camilla and her sisters’ against their will 
(Al Atrush and Abdallah 2015). While ISIS did not give the names of the women who had 
allegedly converted to Islam and were being held against their will, it was very likely 
referring to the highly publicised cases of two Coptic women whom Islamists in Egypt 
had claimed to have converted to Islam but were being forced to live as Christians.  
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Two of the women came out in recorded videos saying that they had not converted 
(Tadros 2013). 
The local police verified that the women had not converted and wanted to continue 
being Copts; however, the Islamists in Egypt staged several protests insisting they 
wanted back ‘their women’ (ibid.). Three years later, ISIS engaged in another terrorist act 
in Libya, justifying it in part as a holy war to reclaim their women – the Coptic women 
who had supposedly converted to Islam. The act of vendetta was claimed against the 
Coptic Orthodox Church – and all crusaders. It is difficult to determine the real target 
behind the act of terrorism – the beheading of 20 migrant workers from Egypt – whether 
it was against the Egyptian state, against a Christian church establishment, or more 
broadly to strike terror in the West, or all of these. However, the instrumentalisation of 
Coptic women as the pretext for murdering members of the same religious community 
(Coptic men) on foreign soil indicated that there is no geographic or time limit to the 
appropriation of the ‘saving our women’ card as a political basis for waging war. 
Similarly, when Boko Haram insurgents abducted 276 schoolgirls from Chibok Secondary 
School, Borno State in north-east Nigeria in April 2014, they were also used as pawns as 
part of Boko Haram’s broader struggles with the government. Aina et al. (2019: 25) note 
that ‘the abducted girls also became pawns in high stakes political disputations, bargains, 
electoral campaigns and negotiations’. It is not unusual for militias and armed actors to 
kidnap women and use them as pawns for the release of soldiers captured by the 
government, but what is distinct here is that the actual targeting of the girls was very 
much influenced by the fact that the majority of the girls were poor Christians. Okoli and 
Nnaemeka Azom (2019) note that the schoolgirls were, in the minds of Boko Haram, war 
booty in the jihad against the infidels. A large contingent of those abducted were 
Christian women from the southern Borno State. A Human Rights Watch study (2014: 
16–17) of the group’s targeting also highlights the insurgents’ targeting of Christians: 
In several video messages posted on YouTube and sent to the media, Boko 
Haram’s leadership made direct threats against Christians. These include a post in 
January 2012, in which the then-spokesperson issued an ‘ultimatum’ of three days 
for Christians to leave the North. In May 2014, Boko Haram’s leader stated in 
another video, ‘This is a war against Christians and democracy and their 
constitution, Allah says we should finish them when we get them.’ Former United 
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Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, publicly expressed 
concern over Boko Haram’s targeting of Christians. 
Undoubtedly, the movement’s violent strategies are not only driven by ideology; they are 
also driven by what Okoli and Nnaemeka Azom (2019: 1228) eloquently term ‘tactical 
opportunism’. This entails seizing upon unexpected political opportunity in order to 
maximise leveraging power in its bargaining with its opponents, or for strengthening its 
own power base. Examples of the movement’s use of tactical opportunism for securing 
concessions include the kidnapping of civil servants and their wives to use as bargaining 
chips to negotiate the release of militants captured by the government, and engaging in 
prisoner swaps to lure security forces into ambush (Iyi 2018: 269). 
Muslim women and men who are perceived to not conform to the insurgents’ code of 
morality (for example, in donning the veil in a particular way) have also been violently 
assaulted and sometimes killed as an expression of the movement’s capacity to terrorise 
communities into conformity. Examples of the use of tactical opportunism to enhance 
the economic power base of the movement includes kidnappings by Boko Haram to 
extract ransom payments. Tactical opportunism is behind the kidnapping of poor Muslim 
boys to serve as child soldiers. The kidnappings of Christian girls themselves are also 
motivated by in part by the opportunism of trading them as chattel in markets (thereby 
raising income for the movement) as well as forced impregnation for breeding a new 
generation of jihadists and foot soldiers (Iyi 2018: 267), sowing terror into any opponents 
of the movement. 
However, caution is needed so as not to assume that the exercise of tactical 
opportunism negates any role for ideology in the movement’s strategies on the ground. 
The intersection of gender and religious marginality significantly enhanced the likelihood 
of being targeted as part of a pre-orchestrated plan. Moreover, there is evidence of 
differentiated treatment by those held in captivity according to their religious affiliation. 
For example, in February 2018, a faction of Boko Haram kidnapped 110 girls and one 
boy from the girls’ school in Dapchi, a town in north-east Nigeria. The government 
engaged in backstage negotiations with the captors and in March 2018, all the girls were 
released from captivity, except one. Her peers said she had refused to say she had 
converted to Islam as was required of all of them and was therefore retained (Maclean 
2018). Thus, even if tactical opportunism explains the indiscriminate targeting of women 
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on occasion, religious affiliation becomes the defining factor in determining the 
predicament of the kidnapped. 
The use of the Burmese military of mass rape against the Rohingya women in the 
genocide of 2017 has been widely recognised as an instrument of oppression (Bowcott 
and Ratcliffe 2020). While the atrocities committed against the Muslim women of 
Rohingya are of exceptional brutality, women who belong to religious minorities living in 
other parts of the country have also been subject to systemic sexual violence for many 
decades. The Burmese military has been using sexual violence against women as a 
weapon of war against those who belong to ethnic/religious minorities in an organised 
and orchestrated manner. The Women’s League of Burma (2004) notes: 
Women and children continue to be raped, used as sex slaves, tortured and 
murdered across the country by the regime's armed forces and authorities. It is 
clear that the rapes and violence are not committed by rogue elements within the 
military but are central to the modus operandi of this regime. Structuralized and 
systematic human rights violations, including sexual violence, are an inevitable 
result of the regime's policies of military expansion and consolidation of control 
by all possible means over a disenfranchised civilian population (Women’s League 
of Burma 2004). 
The deployment of sexual violence as an instrument of the subjugation and terrorisation 
of Muslim and Christian women across the whole country was particularly prevalent 
where there is any concern for public expressions of dissidence against the status quo. 
In instances where women are used as political pawns and their bodies as battlegrounds, 
it is also critically important to give recognition to how the intertwining of gender, class, 
caste, and religion plays out without negating or side-lining the religious dimension. In 
Pakistan, religious minorities being subsumed into lower castes has negative implications 
for women specifically. Gazdar’s (2007) research explores how lower caste groups are 
considered to have no honour, meaning that there is nothing for a member of that 
group to lose if they are violated. Consequently, Gazdar’s research documents cases 
across the whole country of women from chuhra, Scheduled Caste Hindu, and other 
lower caste communities being subjected to rape by well-known perpetrators who know 
they will not be prosecuted. Gazdar found that this violence and discrimination was also 
justified by negative racial attitudes, stemming from beliefs held by Afghan invader tribes 
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from the eleventh century, that women from lower castes were of ‘black lineage’ (Gazdar 
2007). 
A report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan on Forced Conversion noted that, 
particularly in the area of Sindh where poverty is extremely high, Hindu girls, especially if 
they are from the lower castes and come from struggling families, are susceptible to 
being kidnapped and forced to convert. Therefore, the term ‘forced conversion’ is deeply 
problematic in these contexts as it obscures processes under seemingly neutral legal 
terms. For example, families discover that their daughters are ‘officially’ married, but this 
obfuscates the fact that they were abducted, raped, and held in captivity. Families are 
told that their daughters have converted to Islam as a fait accompli but the conditions 
that they have endured and under which they have converted point to the urgency of 
holding to account all who were involved in this ‘conversion’. They should be held 
accountable for being accomplices in the crimes of abduction, rape, and holding women 
in captivity. 
Where families suffer from religious, economic, and social exclusion, the prospects of law 
and order being enforced to return their daughters becomes minimal. Moreover, the 
collusion of powerful actors at a local level in addition to legislation that prohibits 
conversion from Islam makes it difficult to retrieve women and girls who have been 
kidnapped. At a more profound level, families who have found the money to pay lawyers 
or have had civil society organisations’ (CSO) support to challenge the abduction of their 
daughters in court, have found that their testimony is simply not believed when set 
against the testimony and majority faith-embedded narratives of powerful majority 
religious families with wide social connections in the judiciary and in local politics. The 
otherisation processes play out in the legal process, as de facto if not de jure, the 
imbalance in ‘worth’ between those of different religions affects the relative credibility of 
their testimony. 
Other than the direct impact on the women and girls affected by the common 
occurrence of abduction, forced marriage, and forced conversion, these incidents have a 
hugely chilling effect on all women and girls in these communities. But the impacts are 
most felt in poor rural households where women and girls are not allowed to participate 
in events or opportunities outside of the home as a result of the threats against them. As 
part of the CREID project, when partners sought to run focus group discussions (FGDs) 
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with Hindu women, the community were very reluctant to allow women to join and 
participate. There is a view that simply being seen outside by other community members 
may put women at risk. 
The impact is greatest on poor women as Hindu women who have access to private 
forms of transport can avoid both the risk and public gaze. This chilling effect clearly 
adds to poverty in families as women and girls may cease participating in education as a 
result of the threat. They may also decline work roles outside of the home. As the 
International Dalit Solidarity Network makes clear, being of Dalit origin means that they 
are especially vulnerable, but the ideological driver is what keeps them in a position of 
vulnerability and deters their ability to break out of it: 
Dalit women of Pakistan fall victim to sexual abuse, abduction and forced 
religious conversion. Dalit women tell of kidnappings and abductions leading to 
forced conversion and marriage into Muslim families. The stories of the women’s 
families reveal that religious conversion is a barrier to the return of women to 
their families and action by police personnel.2 
The significance of the International Dalit Solidarity Network’s analysis is that it shows 
how the intersection of gender, caste, and poverty exposes a particular cohort of women 
to sexual violence, but their virtual enslavement thereafter on account of having been 
forced into becoming subjugated Muslim subjects is what makes their liberation so 
difficult. As will be discussed in the next proposition, these women are being targeted on 







5. Proposition Three: Ideologically 
motivated sexual grooming 
While poor vulnerable girls and women have been the targets of sexual 
grooming with the intention of sexual predation, there is also an ideologically 
motivated grooming process aimed at the religious conversion of religious 
minority women. 
Proposition three relates to the exercise of a subtle, coercive, and insidious form of 
power which is distinct from the overt, direct acts of violence entailed in proposition two. 
Contrary to the violent use of force described in proposition two (abduction, rape, forced 
impregnation, etc.), the phenomenon described here usually commences with soft, even 
positive expressions of power. At the outset, the lack of violence may even suggest a 
consensual relationship, thereby making it very difficult to unravel the predatory 
intentions. We interrogate below whether the nature of the relationships in question 
amount to sexual grooming, how the targeting of religious minority girls/women is 
distinct from the targeting of vulnerable girls more broadly in its motives, and how it is 
addressed. 
Sexual grooming generally is a highly complex and understudied phenomenon. 
Grooming is about a very particular kind of power relationship which is ‘often used as a 
means to prepare an individual or to place an individual into a position in which they are 
unwittingly subjected to abusive and/or exploitative behaviour’ (Sinnamon 2017: 461–2, 
emphasis added). Sinnamon’s choice of these three words represent some distinctive 
core dimensions of the operation of power in instances of grooming. The subject of the 
grooming is not conscious of the intent of the person whom she is engaging with, and 
hence the unwitting entanglement into a relationship that conceals its ulterior design. 
The second and third words, abusive and exploitative, are indicative of the negative 
impact of the exercise of such power on the person being groomed, particularly with 
respect to ‘sexually exploitative and abusive relationships’ (2017: 460). What makes 
exploitation possible is that the subject being groomed is vulnerable. Vulnerability is 
often more straightforward to establish when the targets are children rather than adults. 
When a predator establishes a relationship with a minor, even if it appears consensual, 
there is a recognition that there is a deeply unequal power hierarchy because the person 
34 
 
groomed is underage. Moreover, in many countries, the law itself recognises the 
vulnerability of minors to child sexual exploitation even when consensual. 
It is very difficult in conventional cases in adult sexual grooming to prove exploitation or 
abuse in the absence of violence for a number of reasons. First, when a subject being 
groomed enters unwittingly into a relationship, this may give the semblance of a 
consensual relationship. Second, when the subject is extremely vulnerable, she may not 
recognise that the harm she is experiencing is premised on exploitation and is actually 
abusive. In the literature, for example, on the grooming of underage children in the 
United Kingdom, there is an acknowledgement that the absence of use of brute force 
does not mean consent. In cases of grooming of underage girls in a number of ring 
cases in the UK, it was noted that initially the exercise of power over the victims was 
through emotional manipulation. This took the form of identifying the subjects’ sources 
of vulnerability in terms of low self-esteem, poverty, neglect, etc. 
From Sinnamon’s analysis (2017: 462), it is possible to gauge two common features 
between child and adult sexual grooming: predators particularly target subjects who are 
vulnerable, and predation follows a pattern of ‘emotional and psychological manipulation 
tactics’. Globally, we know that both children and women experiencing social and 
economic deprivation and those who have been made vulnerable on account of personal 
or family circumstances of all backgrounds can be vulnerable to sexual grooming by 
predators. In other words, this is a phenomenon not specific to women who belong to 
religious minorities. 
Moreover, the presence of religious majority/minority dynamics in society does not by 
default automatically establish vulnerability and/or exploitation when women and men 
marry across religious divides. Even in patriarchal contexts where social norms and values 
entrench male privilege and domination, it does not necessarily signify per se that the 
relationship across the religious divides is informed by predation/exploitation or the 
absence of consent on the part of women (many women consensually enter into deeply 
patriarchal relations with or without religious difference for many different reasons). It is 
also understandable that in cases where women who belong to religious minorities defy 
the conventions of their communities and elope with men not from their religious 
communities, it could cost them their lives (if they are killed by their families on account 
of causing them shame). Hence, what distinguishes the targeting of poor women who 
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belong to religious minorities is neither the religious differentiation per se nor their 
poverty, but where these factors combined with others put them in a position of 
vulnerability. 
What is specific about the sexual grooming of girls and women who belong to religious 
minorities is first its ideological intent and second, that the law protects such acts. Each 
will be elucidated below. 
Ideologically motivated sexual grooming does not detract from its sexually exploitative 
and abusive nature but it does indicate an intent not just to harm the subject but also 
the religious community to which she belongs. What cases from Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, 
and India point to is that a constellation of factors suggests that there are incidents 
which suggest that women were not being engaged with as part of courting, but as part 
of ideologically motivated sexual grooming (sometimes of children and sometimes of 
adults). The ideological motivation is both for the subject herself and her community. 
As with the general phenomenon of child/adult sexual grooming, often men will target 
women from religious minorities who are vulnerable on account of one or a combination 
of vulnerabilities such as economic (poverty and deprivation), social (exposure to 
domestic violence), or psychological (neglect, vilification). These factors do not all have to 
exist, but there is often a constellation of factors that create situations of vulnerability. 
However, what distinguishes sexual predation from ideologically motivated sexual 
grooming is the intention. The first is that there is a political project behind the targeting 
of women from religious minorities. Perhaps one of the most overt of such cases is from 
India, where in 2017 the Hindu Jagran Manch (HJM) announced that it would facilitate 
the marriage of around 2,100 Muslim women who wished to marry Hindu men and 
would also support them financially and provide security, according to The Indian 
Express. The HJM have openly declared that their intention is to promote the conversion 
of Muslims and Christians to Hinduism (Vandevelde 2011). 
CREID’s workshop participants from Nigeria and Egypt gave examples of Muslim men in 
Nigeria and Egypt being given money by government groups to marry Christian women. 
One participant from Nigeria explained how a Muslim woman recounted to a researcher 
that her husband was given money to ‘win over’ Christian women as wives so they could 
have children and grow the Muslim population while diminishing the Christian one. A 
participant from Egypt presented a similar situation, but with an emphasis on the fact 
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that the Muslim men were encouraged to target underaged girls and force them to 
marry for conversion purposes. 
The intention in the cases of ideologically motivated grooming is both as a victory for 
the religious majority as well as the humiliation of the religious minority. On the victory 
for the religious community, the act of the ‘acquiring’ of the religious minority women is 
intended to symbolise the superiority of the religion of the majority. It is also intended 
to humiliate the religious minority by bringing about shame. Since women’s bodies are 
the repositories of a community’s honour, the loss of women is equated with the loss of 
honour. In some cases, the conversion of a woman is celebrated by parading her in her 
own original religious community in order to impress upon them that they have lost one 
of their own. It is interesting that in a field visit by the Pakistani Human Rights 
Commission, a local journalist noted the gender differential pertaining to conversion 
from Hinduism to Islam: ‘When girls converted it was celebrated, but when Hindu boys 
converted they were forced into destitution’ (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
2019: 5). 
The idea of organising processions in the streets that are largely dominated by members 
of the religious minority is an indication that the sexual grooming goes beyond the 
sexual predation of an individual, and that the intent of celebrating the conversions is 
not individual, but collective. When two women disappeared in the infamous case of 
Reena and Raveena, their brother Shaman Das Meghwar also disclosed that cases of 
conversion were frequently being celebrated through jubilant processions in Daharki to 
further harass and depress the Hindu community (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
2019: 4). 
The ideologically motivated nature of sexual grooming is intended psychologically and 
demographically to fulfil a broader political project, that of creating a religiously 
homogenised society. On a strategic level, the conversion of more women would mean 
less procreation of members of the religious minority and therefore a strategy of their 
demographic containment. In many of these contexts, the offspring by law are 
automatically considered born into the majority religion. In other words, this is different 
from sexual grooming, whether of children or adults, where the sexual predation is the 
goal in and of itself and where there is an absence of the advancement of a broader 
community-wide supremacist vision. 
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However, it is not just intent, but also the legal and social responses to the 
disappearance and conversion of girls and women that gives the sexual grooming of 
girls and women its distinct character. It is interesting that the literature on missing 
minority women rarely uses the word ‘grooming’ when talking about the disappearances. 
Grooming assumes a purposeful process, and in many communities where women who 
belong to religious minorities disappear, there is a reluctance to interrogate whether the 
woman disappeared of her own free accord. Activists from Pakistan and Egypt at the 
CREID workshop pointed out that often the police will not act in response to complaints 
from parents with respect to the disappearance of girls, even when they are underage. 
The police’s reaction is that the person may have chosen to elope of her own free 
accord, and therefore it is not the remit of the police to search for her whereabouts. 
This, according to the participants, emboldens those who have kidnapped the girls or 
have them in captivity to threaten families with more violence if they do not desist from 
searching for their daughters. Within the Hindu community in Pakistan, there have been 
instances where supporters of the kidnapper have threatened to capture more women if 
the family of the woman who disappeared insists on finding out the whereabouts of 
their daughter. In that sense, there is fear for a collective punishment of the religious 
minority if they pursue a case of tracking where their daughter is. 
In the CREID workshop, Seema Maheshwary explained how in one case, parents didn’t 
want to report to the police in case it made the kidnapper angry and another of their 
daughters was abducted. There is no expectation that the kidnappers will be found and 
justice served, especially if the family and community is poor. This is corroborated by the 
Pakistani Human Rights Commission report’s field mission, which noted that: 
Cases involving the Meghwar and Kohli communities tended to be reported as 
they were relatively better off financially, but virtually all the forced conversion 
cases of the Bhagri and Bheel communities went unreported (Pakistani Human 
Rights Commission 2019: 5). 
The complicity of the police in taking no action creates a vicious cycle where gender, 
class, and religious affiliation are deeply entangled: a girl or young woman from a 
marginalised background becomes entrapped in a relationship after having been 
groomed. She disappears through kidnapping or seemingly out of her own free will. She 
is held captive. Her parents resort to the police who do not act. This becomes known to 
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the perpetrator and any group endorsing him, which further emboldens them to repeat 




6. Proposition Four: The gender 
hierarchies within 
A religious minority community’s respect for gender equality significantly 
influences poor religious minority women’s sense of their own power. 
In the first proposition presented in this paper, it was argued that while the intersection 
of religious marginality, gender, and poverty intertwine to influence the status, position, 
and circumstances affecting women who belong to religious minorities, this does not 
negate the presence of agency exercised through a wide array of expressions of voice. 
However, the nature of the gender hierarchy within a religious minority also wields 
enormous power on the position of women who belong to religious minorities and their 
ability to exercise their agency, both positively and in ways that circumscribe and limit it. 
There is an adage that poor women who belong to religious minorities will face a triple 
whammy. This is not always so. A woman of limited economic means belonging to a 
despised religious minority does not necessarily or automatically experience a triple 
whammy of discrimination (gender, class, religious marginality) if the socio-religious (or 
ethno-religious) community accords them respect and equal power. It is expedient that 
in any community, be it religious or of no faith, social norms, values, practices, and ideas 
pertaining to the equality of women with men will directly influence women’s 
empowerment. 
The extent to which a community believes in gender equality is a core facet of an 
environment that is enabling for women to exercise their agency. It is also possible that 
women who belong to religious minorities who practise gender equality may be in a 
better situation than women who belong to religious majorities but where the gender 
hierarchy between men and women is more patriarchal, at least as far as their agency or 
level of empowerment is concerned. For example, Mosuo women are China's last 
surviving matriarchy, with an estimated population of around 40,000. In this instance, the 
socio-cultural foundations of gender equality have withstood the deeply patriarchal 
nature of Tibetan Buddhism. On the face of it, there seems to be a triple whammy at 
work. As followers of Tibetan Buddhism experience discrimination in a targeted way by 
the mainland Chinese authorities, they are living in conditions of limited economic 
resources and broader society in general is relatively patriarchal. Yet the gender 
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equitable hierarchy within the community has meant that women from the Mosuo 
community experience an enabling form of agency that does not fit into the idea of 
disempowered objects of a triple whammy of intersecting vulnerabilities. 
Undeniably, the example of Mosuo women is exceptional since there are very, very few 
women who belong to religious minorities or majorities who live in matriarchal societies. 
But the same effect, at least extreme levels, can be seen in Christian communities in 
Pakistan, where patriarchy is still present but gender norms are somewhat less unequal 
than in either the majority Sunni peer families or in fact in any other religious minority 
peer families (e.g. Hindu, Sikh). The opposite may also be true, e.g. minority Muslim 
women in Myanmar may indeed suffer the triple whammy, whilst Christian minority 
women may not to the same extent. What the case study of Mosuo women does 
suggest is that the role of religious communities can be significant in shaping how 
power and powerlessness associated with intersecting inequalities is experienced. 
In all of the case studies discussed in this paper, from northern Nigeria to Egypt, Pakistan 
to Myanmar, India to Iraq, women’s belonging to religious communities plays a central 
role in their lives, even when it intertwines with ethnicity and other identifiers. One of the 
most critical factors that will influence the negotiating power of women who belong to 
religious minorities is how they experience and cope with assault, which lies in their 
communities’ conception of honour. In all of the case studies discussed here, social and 
religious constructs explicitly or implicitly consider a woman’s body as an embodiment of 
her own and her family’s honour and her religious community’s honour at large. Such 
embodied constructs of honour are prevalent in all of these broader societies and 
patriarchal societies more broadly. This serves to accentuate the entrenchment of fear of 
shame and dishonour by the woman, her family, and her religious community. First, the 
honour associated with their personal conduct in terms of gender norms of chastity and 
purity, and second, the honour associated with the image of their religious community as 
pious and dignified. 
The idea that women’s purity is a proxy for a community’s honour is a conception so 
deeply intertwined in Myanmar that it means a denial of the right of Burmese Buddhist 
women to marry a non-Buddhist man (Crouch 2015). The fact that the same restrictions 
are not imposed on Burmese Buddhist men reflects the rationale that it is men who lead 
in patriarchal societies such as that of Myanmar. Yet this is paralleled for religious 
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minority women, where under the rubric of protecting women’s honour, and therefore 
the honour of the community, men from the same community may seek to impose 
restrictions on women’s mobility under the guise of protecting her from potential sexual 
assault. In the cases shared in the workshop convened by CREID, participants cited 
numerous examples of women and girls being denied access to education and the 
opportunity to work or partake in leisurely activities in the bid to protect them from 
potential assault. The restrictions may sometimes be very much based on a genuine 
need to address women’s vulnerability in the absence of rule of law and safety. The 
outcomes are the perpetuation of gender unequal practices and a denial of rights, as 
evidenced by the International Dalit Solidarity Network’s reference to religious minority 
women in Pakistan: 
There are frequent reports that the victims are kidnapped and subjugated to 
physical and emotional abuse involving threats of violence. One unfortunate result 
of the parents’ constant fear of their daughters being abducted, forcibly 
converted and married to those kidnappers, is that it persuades the parents to 
arrange early marriages for their girls sometimes in early teens, with the 
consequential results of early pregnancies, increased child mortality and poverty.3 
In Egypt, where there have been incidents of young Coptic women being targets of 
ideologically motivated sexual grooming and/or kidnappings, sometimes families have 
responded to actual or rumoured cases of disappearances by removing the girls from 
education. The author has documented cases of young girls being removed from primary 
or secondary school by their fathers in the midst of a communal panic about the 
possibility that this may happen to their daughters too. It is very difficult to document 
the scale of this since in many cases, the parents’ first reaction is to deny that this is 
what has driven them to remove their daughters from school out of fear of assault or 
kidnappings. 
There are far-reaching implications for women whose communities’ practice of religion is 
deeply informed by their day-to-day experience of feeling under threat. An environment 
gripped by fear, anxiety, and insecurity discourages women from reporting harm or 






broadly, the state of communal peace. It is interesting that such an environment can 
increase vulnerability to sexual predation. Speaking broadly (rather than specifically to 
religious minorities), Sinnamon notes: 
Religion is a cultural factor well known to be used by predators to manipulate 
their victims. Submission to authority, gender-based roles, rights, and 
responsibilities, and fear of consequences if these religious ‘rules’ are not adhered 
to, are powerful mechanisms that predators use to manipulate, exploit, and 
control their victims. Once the abuse has commenced, these same factors can be 
used to instil fear into the victim as a means of maintaining the relationship and 
ensuring silence. A victim may fear being judged by others within the religious 
group, being ostracised from the congregation or other religious social network, 
and may feel extreme shame and guilt over the sexual acts they have committed 
with the predator, seeing themselves as sinful and deviant. These are all factors 
the predator is able to reinforce in order to control the victim (2017: 471). 
A vicious cycle is set in motion: in the incidence that a girl or woman becomes 
unwittingly involved in a relationship with a sexual predator, she feels too guilty, 
ashamed, and scared to seek help, the person grooming her exploits her sense of 
incapacitation to keep her in silence and subjugation, which in turn makes her become 
more entrenched in situations from which it seems impossible to exit. 
Where women have had the courage to break out of such experiences of ideologically 
motivated grooming, or when they have been rescued from their kidnappers, how the 
communities receive the returnees has a critical impact on the women themselves as well 
as their families. Participants in the workshop spoke with deep pain about how their own 
communities’ shunning of women who have been kidnapped and sexually assaulted had 
devastated survivors’ hope of healing and restorative justice. 
In Nigeria, Hajja Fatima Suleiman notes how it is common for girls and women returning 
to their communities after being subjected to abduction and violence by extremist 
groups, because of their religious affiliation, to be rejected, as the girls and women are 
seen as having changed their ideology. Many of these returnees were forced to don 
Islamic attire, and show subjugation to their kidnappers and compliance with their 
doctrinal precepts. In incidences where survivors were detained in captivity for a long 
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time or were returning with children, they were treated like ‘damaged goods’ that no 
one wants. 
One participant at the workshop from a Yazidi background in Iraq spoke of the enduring 
psychological and physical effects Yazidi women are still experiencing from ISIS’ rape and 
slavery in Iraq. Tragically, even in those incidents where the Yazidi people have returned 
to their original farms and homes, this has not been possible for many of the Yazidi 
women who were victims of ISIS atrocities. Many of them remain, to this day, in 
internally displaced people (IDP) camps as they are too scared that they would be 
rejected and shunned by their families on account of symbolising the loss of community 
honour. Similarly, for Iraq’s Turkmen Shia women, some of whom were also kidnapped 
and sexually assaulted, the leadership of the Turkmen Shia community’s response of 
denial of its occurrence and shunning survivors has not only meant psychological 
devastation and displacement but also denial of the opportunities of seeking restorative 
justice altogether. 
The participant from the Turkman Shia group in Iraq at our CREID workshop, Heman 
Ramzi, noted that because the Papa, the spiritual leadership of the Yazidi community, 
acknowledged the suffering of Yazidi women and pressed members to embrace them 
(even though it did not happen consistently), it was possible to make the legal case in 
relation to the UN and the Iraqi government for legal recognition (for Yazidis as victims 
of genocide) and obtain financial compensation and psychological support. Heman 
Ramzi explained that because the Turkmen Shia leadership did not acknowledge 
women’s experiences, they were denied any opportunities of restorative justice that some 
of the Yazidi women were accorded. 
While a religious community’s methods of appropriating honour plays a central role in 
the positioning of women, other features of its ideology are also critical, in particular 
regarding demography and reproductive health. It is undeniable that the smaller 
numerically a marginalised religious minority is, the more it feels the weight of 
encroachment on it. How it responds to this demographic reality is critical for the status 
and situation of women from within this religious minority. In gender and development 
literature, it has been known that the greater the pressure on women to conceive more 
children, in particular in the context of extreme gender inequalities and the absence of 
good quality reproductive health-care systems, the more likely that women’s wellbeing 
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will be seriously compromised (CREID 2019). This is particularly exacerbated where 
religious ideology is not affirming women’s rights to bodily choice and where religion is 
appropriated to endorse the demographic aspirations of a community. 
One of the participants at the workshop spoke at length about how some Coptic priests’ 
encouragement of women to have more and more children is driven by a desire to avoid 
the shrinking of the Coptic population in Egypt, using religious rhetoric to do so by 
continuously emphasising that ‘children are a gift from God’ (and therefore who would 
want to deny God’s gifts?). This is particularly propagated given the high immigration 
rates and the lower birth rates among the Coptic community in Egypt (Egyptian 
participant in the CREID workshop, anonymised). It incidentally goes against another part 
of the Coptic Orthodox Church (the developmental arm) which strongly advocates and 
funds initiatives intended to enhance women’s reproductive rights and access to 
contraceptives. 
Participants from Myanmar also noted that the religious leaders encourage women from 
their communities to have more children, on the same account, namely in response to 
the demographic reality of living in a majority Buddhist society. They note that the 
rhetoric puts so much pressure on women to have more children that it almost makes 
women feel that they are responsible for the future survival of their community and 
indeed their faith. Again, participants noted that there are incongruences. While some 
faith leaders speak about the importance of women’s status being elevated in their 
community (and how the woman is the cornerstone of the community), on critical issues 
of social justice that are specific to women’s equality (economic opportunities, access to 
education and health care), they fall silent (CREID 2019). This is also relevant to cases 
where assault and aggression is from within/perpetrated by members of one’s own 
religious community; for example, incidences of domestic violence or sexual assault (see 
proposition five below) where the inclination on the part of the leadership is to seek 
conciliation rather than accountability. 
It is important, however, in weighing the impact of this proposition and the one to 
follow, not to equate harm done by patriarchal, elitist, and gerontocratic ideologies and 
practices where they exist within religious communities with the harm incurred from 
broader policies of religious homogenisation and encroachment witnessed and 
experienced from the religious majority in society and a state that enforces policies that 
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entrench religious supremacy. For example, the absence of progressive domestic violence 
policies within a religious minority is devastating, but it exists along a spectrum where 
ideologically motivated sexual grooming, sexual captivity, and enslavement are at the 
other end. This is a theme that empirical case studies will endeavour to unravel in 




7. Proposition Five: The law as an 
instrument of subjugation 
The legal domain can discriminate against women who belong to religious 
minorities in direct and indirect ways, and where economic vulnerability 
accentuates the experience of marginalisation by the law. 
The legal domain can be discriminatory in its content or in its enforcement in ways that 
disproportionately negatively affect religiously marginalised poor women. This 
discrimination is distinct from what is experienced by the broader population of poor 
women or in relation to men who belong to religious minorities. The law and the legal 
domain have long been a site for systemic prejudice against women, the poor, 
minorities, and indigenous peoples (Petersen 2020; Ghanea 2018). However, we are 
proposing four ways in which this has played out legally for women from religious 
minority backgrounds: 
Figure 1: Ways in which legal discrimination affects women from religious minorities 
 
(1) Laws that do not allow religious minorities to implement their own religious 
provisions 
The application of national legislation to religious minority communities in a manner that 
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religious minority women in relation to their male counterparts. The exclusion of equal 
inheritance clauses for women who belong to religious minorities in many Muslim-
majority contexts where Shariah law has been applied is significant in its impact of 
allowing discrimination in the economic sphere. In many countries, there are domains in 
which religious minorities have their own laws and/or courts. Often, where religious 
minorities have their own system of legal governance is in the area of family law. What is 
meant by family law is deeply contextual; it can be limited to matters pertaining to 
marriage, divorce, and custody of children, or it can involve a broader interpretation 
covering inheritance, adoption, and other matters. 
In Iraqi Kurdistan, where there is a decentralised system of governance, Christian women 
stand to gain in the area of inheritance compared to non-Christian women in the same 
region, as the personal status law grants them an equal share of inheritance to men (not 
surprisingly, on account of patriarchal gender hierarchies, this law is not consistently 
applied within the Christian community). Conversely, in the rest of Iraq and in Egypt, 
where Shariah law is enforced for majorities and minorities in the area of inheritance, 
Christian women are negatively affected by not being governed by their own inheritance 
law. 
While the discrimination discussed in the above case study emanates from the denial of 
the enforcement of the religious communities’ own religious precepts, the reverse can 
also occur, namely the very enforcement of the religious communities’ own precepts can 
discriminate against women who belong to religious minorities. As per Shaheed’s report 
(2020: 5): 
In the case of Sri Lanka’s Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act which, unlike national 
legal provisions for non-Muslim women, does not identify a minimum age 
requirement or require a woman to consent to marriage; leaving Muslim women 
and girls unprotected by national provisions. 
The application of discriminatory laws against women who belong to religious minorities 
is in no small part on account of the highly conservative interpretations that are chosen 





(2) Laws which enforce supremacy of the religion of the majority 
There are laws where supremacy of the religion of the majority trumps all other 
considerations, including gender hierarchies, to the detriment of women but also men 
who belong to religious minorities. 
One of the most prevailing myths that has been perpetuated throughout history is that 
as long as religious minorities are accorded their own right to their own religious laws in 
family matters, then there are two parallel and equal systems of governance in operation 
(see Tadros 2009 for the limitations associated with parallel family law). However, this 
idea of two mutually bounded systems of law is premised on the assumption that 
women and men will not intermarry or convert. It is this space in-between the two sets 
of legislations that govern the majority and minorities where there is significant 
discrimination and denial of freedom of choice. 
In Egypt, Iraq, and in most Muslim-majority countries where Shariah law applies, in the 
event that a couple from the same religious minority community (for example, Christians 
or Yazidis) marry, they follow the personal status law of their religious community. 
However, in the event that one of the spouses converts to Islam, irrespective of whether 
it is the woman or the man, any children become automatically considered Muslim, even 
if it is against the will of the child. This is a classic case where the enforcement of the law 
of the religious majority trumps patriarchy. In conventional patriarchal legal systems, the 
rights of men are usually privileged over those of women. However, in this case, should a 
woman convert to Islam, her children by default follow her religion, even if it is against 
the wishes of the father. 
Another powerful example of where the law is deployed to privilege the religion of the 
majority above all other considerations is in Myanmar. In Myanmar, the Buddhist 
Women’s Special Marriage Law, passed in 2015 (which has its historical roots in 
legislation dating back at least half a century), prohibits a marriage between a foreign 
man and a Burmese woman unless the man is a Buddhist. Crouch notes that ‘this 
appears to be based on the common presumption that a “foreign man” means a Muslim 
man, and a Burmese woman means a “Burmese Buddhist woman”’ (2015: 4). 
On the face of it, this was intended to protect Burmese Buddhist women’s rights insofar 
as Muslims in Burma have their own personal status law in accordance with their own 
interpretation of religion, which denies women equal inheritance rights and privileges 
49 
 
men in rights to divorce and child custody. However, it is intended to apply the 
constitutional clause that accords Buddhism a special position and does so by restricting 
Buddhist women’s freedom to marry whomever they wish. Since Myanmar is a country 
with a wide array of religious minorities which includes Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and 
Animists, the legislation was intended to inhibit Burmese women from marrying into 
other religions. 
In both the cases presented above, it is clear that the law does not specifically 
discriminate against religious minority women; however, the overall legal climate of 
according a privileged position to the religion of the majority sends out very strong 
signals about the hierarchy of religions. Certainly, where the husbands of religious 
minority women do convert to Islam in the first example given, they will automatically be 
discriminated against by the legislative system in terms of being able to continue to raise 
their children according to their own faith. 
(3) Laws which are discriminatory towards religious minorities generally but have a 
gender-specific impact (indirect discriminatory effect) in their implementation 
A most recent example of the instatement of religiously prejudicial legislation that 
targets members of a religious community but whose negative impact disproportionately 
affects women is the issuance of the new citizenship law for Muslims in India. On 12 
December, 2019: 
The Indian government had passed a law that fast-tracked citizenship for non-
Muslim refugees from Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Pakistan who moved to India 
before 2015. The new law, which essentially made it more difficult for Muslim 
refugees to claim citizenship, was just the latest move by the ruling Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) to determine who was or wasn’t Indian. And it came just 
months after the Narendra Modi-led government renewed a National Register of 
Citizens (NRC) to identify immigrants living illegally in the state of Assam, 
promising to soon implement it across the country (Bhowmick 2020, 
unpaginated). 
Under the NRC process, people are required to submit documents proving their 
ownership of land, their lineage, and their education. Most women in India do not have 
their names on those kinds of documents. Kavita Krishnan, a gender activist and 
secretary of the All India Progressive Women’s Association notes that: ‘women in this 
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country have the vaguest ideas about when they were born or where they were born’ 
and that ‘the required documents are simply non-existent’. While the law was not written 
in a gender-specific way in its discrimination against women, the reality on the ground 
meant that they were disproportionately affected in demonstrating their eligibility to 
meet the Indian government’s criteria for citizenship. 
Nilanjana Bhowmick notes that after the implementation of the NRC in Assam in the 
northeast of India, from ‘among 1.9 million people who were found to be lacking papers 
for applying for citizenship, 69 per cent of them were women’ (2020, unpaginated). She 
notes that in such contexts, it is likely that among the 69 per cent of the targeted 
populations lacking in papers, a significant number of them would be the Muslim 
women who also happen to be economically excluded or marginalised. 
(4) Laws which are not targeting religious minorities directly in their wording but which 
are enforced in a selective discriminatory manner 
USCIRF’s comprehensive review of blasphemy laws notes that in most cases, the actual 
wording of the law is intended to protect one religion but does not in its content specify 
particular religious minorities: ‘The language in many of these laws is seemingly neutral 
with regard to religious belief and practice’ (USCIRF 2017: 24). The infamous blasphemy 
laws implemented in Myanmar, northern Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt are such examples. 
What is being suggested here is that context is the most important determinant of how 
a neutrally worded blasphemy law is applied. 
The USCIRF report (2017: 29) notes: 
Laws do not operate in a vacuum devoid of political, judicial, and social contexts. 
In the case of blasphemy laws, implementation can vary significantly, depending 
on a range of considerations that include a state’s political landscape, governing 
structures, law-enforcement capabilities, judicial culture, socio-historical 
relationship to religion(s), and pattern of responses to violence, as well as public 
attitudes about blasphemy and blasphemy laws. In some cases, states proactively 
prosecute individuals for transgressing blasphemy laws. In other cases, the laws 
are rarely enforced, if at all. […] However, evaluating the plain language of the law 
cannot quantify the scope or intensity of the abuses that may occur in practice. 
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Blasphemy laws are renowned globally to disproportionately affect religious minorities or 
those of no faith (in terms of in comparison to the percentage of their population). They 
also disproportionately affect free thinkers and members of the intelligentsia who often 
by virtue of their profession happen not to be from the most economically marginalised 
poor. However, there are also incidents where the intersection of religious affiliation, 
gender, and poverty serve to accentuate the vulnerability of the individual to be the 
object of a witch hunt. 
In Pakistan, one of two countries with the most pernicious application of the blasphemy 
law according to the USCIRF assessment (2017), this becomes particularly evident in the 
case of Asia Bibi. Asia Bibi was a former labourer from an economically and socially 
excluded class, who also happened to be Christian. When in 2010 she was working in the 
fields and drank from a cup that Muslims use to drink (and by default was seen to have 
polluted the cup) this raised the ire of some members of the Muslim community, who 
accused her of blasphemy against the prophet Muhammed. She was sentenced and 
spent eight years on death row before being acquitted in 2019. The insinuation here is 
not that where people have been tried on blasphemy allegations, these are all likely to 
have been driven by the intertwining of poverty, gender, caste, and religious affiliation. 
Rather, it is to say that there are incidences, such as the cases of Asia Bibi and Bridget 
Agbahime (mentioned in proposition one) where their positioning in environments that 
are already communally charged against religious minorities made it easy to target them. 
On account of limitations of space, it is not possible to engage with the subtle nuances 
under each of these sub-propositions. However, it is important to note that the law does 
not treat all religious minorities in the same way. In most of the countries mentioned in 
this paper, there is a differential treatment of religious minorities in the law. For example, 
the infamous citizenship law passed in India does not apply to Christians and other 
religious minorities but only to Muslims. In Egypt, the recognition of the rights of the 
Abrahamic religions to be represented in their identity cards is not accorded to people 
of the Baha’i faith. In Pakistan, the position of Ahmadis is considerably more vulnerable 
than Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, or Shias due to the directly discriminatory legal provisions 




8. The governmentality of invisible 
targeting of women who belong to 
religious minorities 
The above propositions each tell a story of a constellation of factors influencing the 
nature of targeting, the factors that accentuate vulnerability to targeting, and the 
agential dimension of how women experience and cope with them. However, these 
propositions are also deeply intertwined, and while not linear nor straightforward, they 
are informed by broader underpinning power dynamics. In this section, we seek to 
explain how these propositions interact with each other through the concept of 
governmentality and exploring the drivers behind such targeting. Governmentality is 
used here in the Foucauldian meaning of the word to refer to how power is exercised in 
pervasive ways to create systems of control and domination. In the context of this 
inquiry, it refers to how in any given context, the dynamic interaction of a combination 
of the propositions that we have presented above serves to create religious hierarchies 
that reflect and engender religious otherisation and promote oppressive religious 
homogenisation. 
At the heart of governmentality of religious otherisation is an ideology of religious 
supremacy. The control of women who belong to the religious ‘other’ is a key means 
through which religious homogenisation is pursued. This ideology can be advanced 
through state or non-state actors or a collusion of the two. It can manifest itself through 
foreign policy, political economy, social norms and beliefs, or combinations thereof. 
Actors who are promoting policies and practices of religious supremacy in contexts 
where populations are religiously diverse may pursue one or more forms of religious 
homogenisation. Sometimes, they may attempt to violently eliminate the presence of 
religious minorities (as we saw in Myanmar, India, northern Nigeria, and Iraq), or they 
may adopt policies of containment and subjugation that over long periods of time create 
‘ceilings’ that religious minorities dare not contest or challenge (such as in Pakistan, 
Egypt, and India). In all such cases, it is often a combination of political, economic, social 




Religious otherisation occurs as a process and as an outcome. This does not mean that it 
is the only process occurring, or it is the only driver with explanatory power for complex 
situations on the ground. Tactical opportunism colludes with religious otherisation in 
multiple ways. Political economy drivers sometimes serve the same ends (religious 
otherisation) or sometimes they serve completely different ends; for example, using 
religious minorities as pawns for achieving other objectives. The meta-narrative emerging 
here is around the governmentality of religious homogenisation processes and the 
exercise of power to strengthen religious hierarchies. 
Religious supremacy colludes with highly reactionary political ideologies. Such an 
interface is manifest, for example, in the militaristic ultra-nationalistic ideology of the 
army in Myanmar. The mass rape and sexual violence used against the Rohingya women 
was politically orchestrated and mediated as part of a wider plan to annihilate and 
destroy the entire community. 
The second dimension of governmentality of religious supremacy is the interface 
between formal and informal sites of power that enable the targeting of religious 
minority women. For example, ideologically motivated sexual grooming operates 
informally in Pakistan (there is no formal institution or policy that officially endorses the 
grooming of Hindu girls). However, the informal processes of the ideologically motivated 
sexual grooming of girls are facilitated through the formal exercise of the legal 
framework which enables the conversion into the dominant religion, disregards the 
prerequisite evidence of such a conversion being made freely, and punishes those who 
convert from it. 
Moreover, a law that accords the child the dominant religion if one of his parents belong 
to it is one that enforces religious supremacy. This is in operation with informal forms of 
exercise of power such as when mobs threaten and exercise violence, while benefiting 
from a culture of impunity. What enables such an interface, which represents the third 
dimension of governmentality, is the targeting of those who are experiencing multiple 
intersecting vulnerabilities. This explains the targeting of women who belong to religious 
minorities who are from poor, socially excluded, marginalised communities. Perpetrators 
are emboldened to act not only by virtue of an enabling legal system and informal 
mechanisms, but also because of the socioeconomic vulnerability of these women. 
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The third dimension of governmentality is the gender ideology of the nation and the 
religious minority in relation to embodied conceptions of honour. The idea of the 
protection/violation of a woman’s body being the proxy for family, tribal, community, 
and indeed a nation’s honour has been amply addressed in feminist post-colonialist 
scholarship. In this inquiry, women’s bodies have been appropriated to symbolise the 
honour of religion itself. The dishonouring of the body of a woman from a religious 
minority is an exhibition of superiority, and indeed, conquest, by the religious majority. 
The appropriation of women’s bodies as pawns in power struggles is deeply political, 
achieving both strategic and tactical ends. For religious minorities, all kinds of restrictions 
are placed on women, ranging from mobility, education, and visibility to justify the 
protection of the honour of the community, and the religion it follows. This can manifest 
itself in intensely patriarchal expressions of hypermasculinity among the religious 
majority and minority, as women’s bodies become battlegrounds, in the name of the 
sacred. 
It also manifests itself in the legal domain as well – with laws to ensure that women who 
belong to the religious majority are ‘protected’ from ‘dishonourable’ partners and men 
from the religious minority do not dare to dishonour the women from the majority. This 
puts an enormous burden on women who belong to religious minorities, because if they 
hold to account powerholders from their own religious backgrounds, they are made to 
feel that they are traitors. They are made to feel that they are not only putting the 
honour of their religious communities under fire, but if there is intervention on their 
behalf, this may become the trigger for communal violence. 
Another key dimension of governmentality which enables the interface of the formal and 
informal in how targeting of religious minority women occurs is the insidious power of 
silence. With the exception of genocides (Iraq, Myanmar), the intersections of religious 
marginality, poverty, and gender as they affect women from religious backgrounds is 
conventionally overlooked. What explains this silence is a number of factors. First, the 
complex, multifaceted dimensions of conflict are not fully recognised. In some cases, the 
political appropriation of ethnicity is recognised as a driver of conflict, but its overlap 
with the religious dimension is overlooked. Sometimes the fault-lines are close enough, 
but other times they are not at all. Conflating the two and downgrading or ignoring 
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either one does a disservice to being able to understand what is going on in a situation 
of conflict or oppression. 
The creation of a culture of denial around the targeting of women who belong to 
religious minorities and experience socioeconomic vulnerabilities is the assumption that if 
women are being targeted on account of tactical opportunism, this negates religiously 
motivated targeting. For example, it has been established that ISIS have found the sex 
trafficking of captured Yazidi women to be a lucrative business and there are clear 
economic benefits from their perspective from their involvement in such practices. Yet 
the economic benefits of these practices should not detract from the fact that the 
targeting of Yazidi women in the first place was ideologically driven. 
Another factor that contributes to the negation of the targeting of religious minority 
women is the confounding of lack of force/violence with consent. For example, in cases 
of ideologically motivated sexual grooming, because women seem to willingly enter into 
relationships with predators who have a cover of caring men, there is a reluctance to 
address the underlying intent, power dynamics, context, and outcomes of such 
relationships. 
Finally, a major contributing factor to the sustenance of silence around the experiences 
of women who are from religious minority backgrounds is the absence of systematic 
data on the prevalence, patterns, long-term implications, and outcomes of their 
targeting. Part of the reason is the sheer terror experienced by poor families of the 
consequences of disclosure for themselves and their entire communities, which leads to 
concealing the dynamics of discrimination or denying them altogether. Another is the 
focus of some research on incidences of exceptional violence as opposed to day-to-day 
experiences of encroachment. It is this gap that CREID’s forthcoming research 





Women who are from a religious minority background are not necessarily acutely 
vulnerable if they have political and economic power and their communities have 
progressive gender ideologies. As mentioned in the introduction, the intention here is 
not to suggest that all poor women who are members of religious minorities are 
targeted in a worse way than all other people. The intention is not to create a hierarchy 
of who suffers the most. The intention it is to make visible the invisible experiences and 
forms of targeting that are associated with the nexus of religious marginality, gender, 
and class. The intertwining of these forms of inequality are critical in contexts of religious 
otherisation because on the one hand, they expose these women to particular forms of 
vulnerability that are distinct from other poor women who do not belong to religious 
minorities, and on the other hand, they expose these women to specific gender-based 
forms of violations that male members of religious minorities may not experience. 
Being targets of discrimination and encroachment does not mean a lack of exercise of 
agency, as we saw with the collective mobilisation by Muslim women against the 
citizenship law more recently in India. In the next phase of the research to be undertaken 
by the Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development, we will engage with 
women who are situated within these complex power dynamics in order to understand 
their perspectives, interpretive lens, and the ways of representing subjectivities in relation 
to different interlocutors. This will be undertaken by women who are from these 
communities and whose own positionality is one that is considered, in the eyes of the 
women themselves, legitimate. In view of the substantial diversity within the women in 
each of the different contexts in which CREID works, the intention is to understand the 
dynamics at hand rather than to arrive at common denominators. 
Under each of these propositions, glaring gaps have emerged in our understanding of 
very complex processes that are very difficult to trace and unpack. For example, there is 
a severe deficit in our understanding of how ideologically motivated sexual grooming 
occurs. How do sexual predators win the trust of these women? How do the latter 
manage to keep it secret when they are under such heavy surveillance from their 
families? How does psychological entrapment happen? 
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The propositions presented in this paper cumulatively represent the starting point of an 
iterative process of framing, data gathering, and validation, and a continued revisiting of 
our assumptions. Through the interpretive lens and work of women and men from within 
these communities, we will endeavour to go beyond the visible forms of power. The 
granular understanding of processes and impact will undoubtedly expose more gaps in 
our knowledge, unearth more unanswered questions, and challenge us to rethink our 
methodological approaches as well as our assumptions. 
Whilst our knowledge remains incomplete, this does not prevent us from acting on the 
knowledge and insights that we gather as we unravel the complexity, nuance, depth, and 
scope of the targeting that poor women from religious minority backgrounds have 
experienced. This is not to deny their agency, nor to deny that others also suffer, but to 
make visible these recurring patterns of inequality, and to recognise the role of religious 
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